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Dunng the 1980s, both the Judicial Conference of the United States,
which is the policy-making arm of the federal courts, and Congress evinced
increasing concern about the proliferation of local civil procedures, such
as local rules and the procedures that individual judges apply The Judicial
Conference and Congress were particulaily troubled by those local
procedural requirements that conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules) or provisions of the Umted States Code.
In 1986, the Judicial Conference commissioned the Local Rules
Project to collect and organize all local rules, standing orders of individual
judges, and other local procedural strictures.' In 1989, the Local Rules
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I am a member of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Montana
and of the District Local Rules Review Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council;
however, the views expressed here are my own. I wish to thank David Pimentel and Peggy
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this
Article, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are my
own.
The information provided here is part of a larger project in which I have been attempting
to evaluate implementation of the Judicial Improvements Acts (JIA) of 1988 and 1990. See
generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal District, 53 MONT. L.
REV 239 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1393 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization]; Carl Tobias,
Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV 1589 (1994)
[hereinafter Tobias, Improving]. The suggestions derived from my assessment of the
implementation that has occurred thus far seem sufficiently worthwhile to warrant publicizing
them in the hope that they might receive serious consideration.
1. See COMMrrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 1
(1989) [hereinafter, LOCAL RULES PROJECT]; see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role
of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62, 63 (presenting valuable summary of Local Rules
52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 359 (1995)
Project published a comprehensive report finding that judges had pre-
scribed approximately 5,000 local rules and many additional procedures -
variously characterized as general, standing, special, scheduling, or minute
orders - that regulate local practice.2 Quite a few of these requirements
conflicted with the Federal Rules, provisions of the United States Code, or
procedures used in the other ninety-three districts. Districts and individual
judges had adopted and applied inconsistent procedures, despite prohibition
of this practice in the Rules Enabling Act and in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83 (Rule 83).1
The Local Rules Project determined that the local requirements
covered a broad array of procedural topics. The most widely prescribed
procedures governed the pretrial process, especially pretrial conferences
and discovery I A number of judges fashioned and implemented measures
for tracking and attempting comparatively early in litigation to resolve
routine, simple lawsuits, and numerous districts imposed presumptive
numerical limitations on interrogatories. 5
Project).
2. See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1; see also Telephone Interview with
Mary P Squiers, Project Director of Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992); Telephone
Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant to the Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992).
Numerous individual judges had applied many unwritten procedures. See, e.g., U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MONT., CiIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-4
(1991) (describing coequal assignment of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate
judges); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF WYO., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 13 (1991) [hereinafter WYOMING PLAN] (requiring "parties to make every
reasonable and good faith effort to resolve discovery disputes before seeking assistance from
the Court" and to so certify in writing).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988); FED. R. Civ P 83; see also Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV 1999, 2020-26 (1989) (describing various local procedures and
stating that they were often inconsistent with Federal Rules or federal law). See generally
Coquillette et al., supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 235(7); see also Robert F Peckham, The Federal Judge
as a Case Manager- The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L.
REv 770, 773-79 (1981) (explaining procedures governing pretrial process); cf. LOCAL RULES
PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5. See, e.g., BOARD OF JUDGES OF THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (1991) (referring to earlier adoption of special procedures for
treating social security cases and cases involving $100,000 or less); WYOMING PLAN, supra
note 2, at 2 (referring to earlier adoption of special procedures to be applied to noncomplex
cases); see also Subrin, supra note 3, at 2021-26 (surveying local rules of discovery).
SUGGEStiONS FOR LOCAL PROCEDURES REVIEW
The federal judiciary and Congress responded in several ways to the
complications that local proliferation presented.6 The Judicial Conference
supported the 1985 revision of Rule 83, which requires that districts adopt
local rules after providing public notice and opportunity for comment and
that individual-judge standing orders be consistent with the Federal Rules
and the local rules of the district in which the judge sits.' The advisory
committee note that accompanied the 1985 amendment asked that all
districts implement processes for issuing and reviewing these orders and
requested that circuit judicial councils assess all local rules for validity and
for consistency with. the Federal Rules and local procedures in the
remaining districts.'
II. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988
Five decades after the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
took effect, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act (JIA) of 1988.1 The JIA's main objectives were to reduce local
procedural proliferation and to restore the primacy of the Federal Rules
and the importance of national rule revision.) Congress seemingly meant
for the legislation to revive and maintain significant procedural tenets -
such as uniformity and simplicity - that had animated the Advisory
6. The Judicial Conference commissioned the Local Rules Project to study the
problems presented by local proliferation and, upon receiving the Local Rules Project's report,
issued an order asking the districts to conform local procedures to the Federal Rules and
presenting many additional suggestions for treating local proliferation. See Tobias,
Balkanization, supra note *, at 1399 (noting Judicial Conference's issuance of order requesting
districts to conform procedures and its suggestion to number local rules in manner consistent
with Federal Rules); Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1597 (same); see also supra notes
1-5 and accompanying text.
7 See FED. R. Civ P 83; see also FED. R. Civ P 83 advisory committee's note
(1985 amendment). See generally David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil
Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv 537 (1985).
8. See FED. R. Civ P 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment); see also
Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1596 (discussing 1985 revision of Rule 83).
9. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
10. See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1599. See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C. L. REV 795 (1991).
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Committee on the Civil Rules when it proposed the initial Federal Rules a
half-century earlier."
Congress intended to address the problem of local proliferation partly
by regularizing local procedural amendment processes and opemng them
to public participation.12 The JIA required that each federal district appoint
a local rules committee to assist all of the district's judges in developing
local procedures and that each court afford notice and opportumty for
public comment when prescribing new, or revising existing, local rules. 3
Congress correspondingly attempted to restrict proliferation by imposing
an affirmative responsibility on circuit judicial councils to evaluate
periodically all local procedures for consistency with the Federal Rules and
by authorizing those councils to modify or abrogate any procedures found
to conflict with the Federal Rules.14 Congress apparently meant for these
commands to govern individual-judge procedures."
Unfortunately, very few circuit judicial councils in the twelve United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal have fully implemented the requirements
relating to appellate court oversight that are found in the 1985 amendment
of Rule 83 or the 1988 JIA. Several important factors, attributable to both
Congress and the federal judiciary, apparently explain the incomplete
effectuation of the commands.
1I. See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1599-1601 (discussing congressional intent);
see also Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300-01 (1994) (discussing 1988 JIA and its concern with "the
balkanizing effect of proliferating local rules").
12. See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1599-1601.
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally David S.
Day & Margo R. Tschetter, The Local Rule Revision Project: The South Dakota Experience,
38 S.D. L. REv 500 (1993).
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(a) (1988); see also Tobias, Balkanization, supra
note *, at 1401 (noting difficulties that circuit judicial councils confronted, such as
determining conflict between local rules and Federal Rules). The JIA imposed a continuing
obligation on the councils to review local procedures existing on the legislation's December
1, 1988 effective date and any requirements thereafter prescribed. See also Tobias,
Improving, supra note *, at 1623-27 (stating that Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990
effectively suspended 1988 JIA); infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (same); cf.
Carrington, supra note 11, at 300-01 (discussing 1988 JIA).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 notes (1988). The JIA made the amendment process exclusive
in an effort to prevent districts and judges from avoiding the requirements by denominating
local procedures as something other than "local procedures," such as "standing orders." See
id. § 2071(f); see also Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1600 (providing additional
examination of congressional intent in passing 1988 JIA).
SUGGESTIONS FOR LOCAL PROCEDURES REVIEW
First, although Rule 83 and the HA mandate review and abrogation or
alteration of local procedures deemed to be inconsistent with the Federal
Rules or provisions of the Unted States Code, 6 some circuit judicial
councils understandably may have been reluctant to implement rigorously
these requirements."7 Circuit judges serving on those councils may have
deferred to district judges in the discharge of their responsibilities to
establish processes for adopting and revising local procedures and to
promulgate and amend those procedures, and, when the councils fulfilled
their duties, to monitor and abolish or modify any of the local procedures
that the councils determined to be inconsistent." The circuit judges may
have deferred because they believed that district judges individually and
collectively know more about civil litigation at the trial court level
generally and within each circuit's districts specifically 19
Second, the district judges, in complying with their obligations as
council members, may have had some "conflicts of interest." 20  One
important conflict may have involved each judge's duties (1) to implement
local procedural adoption and revision processes and to prescribe and
revise local procedural requirements and (2) to monitor the procedures that
judges in other districts in the circuit had promulgated.2' It appears that
few district judges m their capacity as council members wanted to analyze
closely or alter procedures that the judges may have been envisioning for,
or may have already adopted in, their own districts because the judges may
have been less concerned about reducing inconsistency than about
furthering what they believed to be the best interests of their own
districts.'
Third, a number of district judges serving on the councils may have
thought that they were insufficiently familiar with local circumstances in
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(a) (1988); FED. R. Civ P 83.
17 For discussion of the circuit review committees' analogous reluctance to scrutinize
procedures that federal districts adopted under the CJRA, see Tobias, Balkanization, supra
note *, at 1406-07 See also infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
18. See Tobias, Balkauzation, supra note *, at 1406-07; see also supra notes 7-8, 12-15
and accompanying text.
19. See Tobias, Balkanization, supra note *, at 1406-07
20. For additional discussion of conflicts of interest, see td. at 1407
21. See itd., see also Day & Tschetter, supra note 13, at 515-16 (indicating some
reluctance by local rules committee to abrogate or modify inconsistent or redundant local
rules); supra notes 7-8, 12-15 and accompanying text.
22. See Tobias, Balkanzation, supra note *, at 1407
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the districts whose procedures they were evaluating to make meaningful
changes even in those requirements found to be inconsistent.' Other
judges, out of professional or personal courtesy or respect for persons
occupying the same position in the judicial hierarchy, may have deferen-
tially examined local procedures.' Implicit and perhaps explicit in much
of the above discussion is the highly sensitive nature of local procedural
review For example, numerous district judges are very protective of their
prerogatives to adopt and apply local procedures.
Finally, the few councils that apparently attempted to undertake
comprehensive and careful review may have been stymied by the task's
onerous nature.' This may have been particularly true in appellate
courts - such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit - that comprise large numbers of federal districts or include
districts that have many local procedures. Congressional failure to
appropriate any funding to implement this aspect of the 1988 JIA addition-
ally complicated the work of circuit councils, all of which have limited
resources for accomplishing a broad range of burdensome responsibilities.
Notwithstanding these significant complications, some circuit judicial
councils initiated rigorous efforts, and others made laudable attempts, to
comply with the requirements that Rule 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed on
them.26 For example, the Ninth Circuit relied substantially on volunteer
attorneys and law-student interns for help in reviewing local civil, criminal,
and bankruptcy procedures.27 Those who participated in the bankruptcy
rule review project have made significant progress, but they have been able
to do so only by relying on the work-study funds of the University of San
23. For additional discussion of insufficient familiarity with local procedures in a closely
related context, see id. See also supra notes 7-8, 12-15 and accompanying text.
24. For additional discussion of deferential examination in a closely related context, see
Tobias, Balkanization, supra note *, at 1407 See also Day & Tschetter, supra note 13, at
515-16 (expressing similar ideas about local rules committee).
25. I rely substantially here on conversations with numerous people who are
knowledgeable about councils' implementation efforts and many council documents. See,
e.g., sources cited infra notes 26, 43.
26. See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal
Affairs, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit (July 22, 1994); Telephone Interview with
Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the First Circuit (July 22,
1994).
27 See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 26; see also Tobias,
Balkanization, supra note *, at 1408 & n.78 (asserting that Ninth Circuit Review Committee
conducted rigorous review under CJRA).
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Diego School of Law to pay student researchers and by soliciting resources
from the local attorney-admission funds of the various districts.2
However, the Ninth Circuit committee that had been working on civil
and criminal district rules was frustrated by the onerous character of the
task entailed in monitoring fifteen districts' procedures and suspended its
efforts to complete a comprehensive review 29 A new District Local Rules
Review Committee has recently been constituted under the auspices of the
Chief District Judges Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council,
which Chief. Judge Robert Coyle of the Eastern District of California
chairs.30
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace raised the issue of
funding for local procedural review with Ralph Mecham, the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and urged that
sufficient resources be allocated to permit the circuit to effectuate the 1988
statutory mandate. Mecham suggested that the Ninth Circuit seek the
money as a part of its annual budget request, but the Ninth Circuit's 1995
budget request for the review project was denied. Chief Judge Wallace has
renewed his plea for the necessary resources; however, those responsible
for the judiciary's budget have yet to respond to this concern.
The 104th Congress has clearly and strongly indicated that it intends
to reduce government spending substantially This Congress appears
particularly unlikely to provide funding for a new project whose purpose
is the improvement of the federal courts; therefore, it will probably expect
the federal judiciary to achieve more with fewer resources.
The Fourth Circuit Judicial Council has not undertaken, and does not
presently envision commencing, a review of local procedures for consis-
tency 1, Samuel W Phillips, the Fourth Circuit Executive, suggested that
the circuit council lacks sufficient resources and personnel to review all of
the local procedures; such review would be a "mammoth task" because
nine federal districts are situated within the Fourth Circuit.32 Phillips stated
28. See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 26.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Telephone Interview with Samuel W Phillips, Circuit Executive, United States
Courts for the Fourth Circuit (Jan. 18, 1995).
32. See id. Chief Judge Sam J. Ervin, III of the Fourth Circuit considerd the feasibility
of reviewing all of the local procedures within that circuit for consistency with the Federal
Rules and provisions of the United States Code. However, he determined "that without the
manpower or the money it is not feasible for the Fourth Circuit to undertake such a review."
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that the circuit judicial council believes that any problems with the local rules
would readily surface and be addressed.3 3 He added that some of the
districts in the Fourth Circuit may have conducted reviews of their local
procedures.
34
A random survey of districts located within the Fourth Circuit indicates
that they have implemented varying approaches, ranging across a broad
spectrum from comparatively rigorous review of local procedures for
consistency to no review A number of districts have simultaneously
modified their local procedures and scrutinized them for consistency in the
context of implementing the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 199031 or
the 1993 Federal Rules amendments, which permitted districts to alter or
decline to adopt specific procedural amendments, principally governing
discovery 36
The activities of the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia
are illustrative.37 Those courts appointed working groups for both districts.
The working groups then attempted, in light of the changes in the Federal
Rules, to undertake a complete revision of the local rules to make local rules
in the two districts uniform.3s Correspondingly, federal district judges m the
District of Maryland and the Eastern District of Virginia expressed the belief
that their local rules were consistent with federal requirements.39
Letter from Samuel W Phillips, Chief Executive, United States Courts for the Fourth Circuit,
to Carl Tobias, Professor of Law, University of Montana 1 (Feb. 14, 1995) (on file with
author).
33. See Telephone Interview with Samuel W Phillips, supra note 31.
34. See id.
35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ P 26(a)(1) (prescribing local option for automatic, or
mandatory, prediscovery disclosure); cf. Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1611-15
(describing process of revising Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26).
37 Cf. Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REv 89, 99-105 (1993) (discussing early implementation of CJRA in Northern and Southern
Districts of West Virginia).
38. See Telephone Interview with John W Fisher, II, Professor, West Virginia
University College of Law (Jan. 20, 1995).
39 See Telephone Interview with Robert E. Payne, Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Chair, Local Rules Committee of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Jan. 25, 1995); Telephone Interview with
J. Frederick Motz, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and
Chair, Local Rules Committee of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
(Jan. 24, 1995).
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Another important reason why a number of circuit judicial councils may
have implemented Rule 83 and the JIA less thoroughly than they otherwise
might have was that certain aspects of the 1990 CJRA essentially suspended
effectuation of the 1988 JIA.4° For instance, the CJRA implicitly encouraged
districts to adopt inconsistent local procedures for reducing expense and
delay in civil litigation; the statute also created circuit review committees, in
addition to the councils, and assigned the committees responsibility for
overseeing implementation of the procedures.4
Some circuit judicial councils, therefore, may have been justifiably
reluctant to scrutinize, much less alter, procedures that Congress apparently
authorized and that Congress charged an analogous, but different, institution
with reviewing.42 It should not have been surprising that the Sixth Circuit
Judicial Council voted to suspend monitoring of local procedures under the
JIA pending the receipt of additional guidance from Congress, the Judicial
Conference, or case law as to whether the provisions of the CJRA take
precedence over the Federal Rules.4 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's recently
constituted District Local Rules Review Committee has requested the Ninth
Circuit Judicial Council's views on how the committee should conduct its
review in light of the CJRA. 4
IX. Suggestions for Reducing Local Procedural Proliferation
The above complications do not necessarily mean that the circuit judicial
councils are powerless to affect the proliferation of inconsistent local
40. See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1623-27 (discussing conflicts between JIA
and CJRA and CJRA's effective suspension of JIA).
41. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 473-474 (Supp. V 1993); see also Tobias, Balkanization, supra
note *, at 1406-09, 1414-22 (discussing implementation of CJRA, its internal inconsistencies,
and its conflicts with external requirements); Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1623-27
(discussing conflicts between JIA and CJRA).
42. See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1623-27 (discussing conflicts between JIA
and CJRA and procedures and institutions that Congress authorized). Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 332 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prescribing circuit judicial councils) with id. § 474 (Supp. V
1993) (prescribing circuit review committees).
43. See United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of
the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit 4-5 (May 4, 1994) (on file with author); see also
Tobias, Balkanzation, supra note *, at 1406-08 (asserting that some circuit review committees
conducted rigorous oversight under CJRA); Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1605 & n.106
(discussing overlapping tasks of procedural revision assigned under CJRA and its effective
suspension of efforts under JIA).
44. See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 26.
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procedures. Those councils should seriously consider instituting a modest
proposal for ameliorating the difficulties enumerated: The councils ought to
enlist the assistance of law professors, other volunteer attorneys, or law-
student interns m each of the federal districts in their circuits. 45
The faculty, lawyers, and students could collect, analyze, and synthesize
all local procedures for the purpose of identifying potential conflicts between
them and the Federal Rules or the United States Code. The professors,
attorneys, and students could carefully designate the local procedures that the
districts had adopted pursuant to the CJRA and those that the districts and
individual judges had prescribed under other authority - essentially Rule 83,
the 1988 JIA, or inherent judicial power.
The councils could then systematically review for inconsistency and
abrogate or modify the procedures that districts and individual judges had
promulgated pursuant to authority that is not m the CJRA. Should Congress
permit the CJRA to sunset as scheduled in 1997,1 the conflicting procedures
adopted under the CJRA ought to sunset as well. If Congress decides to
extend the CJRA, it must harmomze the JIA and the CJRA by clearly
providing how circuit councils that are attempting to implement the JIA
should treat inconsistent procedures adopted under the CJRA.47
Implementation of this limited approach would enable the circuit judicial
councils to make substantial progress toward rectifying the problems that the
proliferation of conflicting local procedures creates. Should Congress allow
the CJRA to sunset in 1997, the circuit judicial councils could rather
expeditiously complete the task of remedying or reducing any remaining
inconsistencies, particularly if Congress appropriates resources for doing so.
Should Congress extend the statute, Congress would have to reconcile the
oversight duties that the JIA assigns councils and the apparent authority that
the CJRA affords districts to adopt conflicting local procedures.
45. I am indebted to Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive for the United States
Courts for the First Circuit, for first mentioning this possibility to me and to David Pimentel,
Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal Affairs for the United States Courts for the Ninth
Circuit, for discussing the proposal and the Ninth Circuit's implementation efforts with me.
See supra note 26. For additional suggestions relating to future efforts that could reduce local
procedural proliferation, see Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1627-34.
46. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (Supp.
V 1993).
47 See Tobias, Improving, supra note *, at 1623-27 (discussing need for Congress to
harmonize JIA and CJRA for purposes of implementation). See generally Lauren Robel,
Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv 1447 (1994).
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IV Conclusion
The multiplication of local procedures, especially strictures that
contravene the Federal Rules or provisions of the United States Code, has
troubled Congress and the Judicial Conference for some time. If the circuit
judicial councils and Congress follow the modest recommendations afforded
above, they should be able to ameliorate the complications attributable to
local procedural proliferation even at a time when the legislative and judicial
branches of the federal government possess comparatively few resources for
effecting improvements.
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